Brazil Nuts and Human: mazes to the Amazon Forest conservation.

  Brazil Nuts and Human: mazes to the Amazon Forest conservation.

Abstract:

The Amazon rainforest has an important role in the regulation of several biogeochemicals cycles on a global scale. Although there has been a global consensus that conservation of the Amazon is necessary for the world ecological equilibrium, the Brazilian Government historically has been incapable of pursuing both economic development and the environmental conservation, with ensuing disastrous consequences for the rainforest. Before 1960 the forest was practically intact. From that decade until the present, almost 800,000 km² have been deforested – nearly 20% of the original forest. This loss of forest is not only an environmental disaster but a great social tragedy. Communities who have been in the forest for centuries and millennia are being expelled from their territories to urban peripheries and losing the basis for their traditional ways of life. Since the 1980’s, these communities have been fighting for their territorial rights, achieving the creation of protected areas for traditional communities as a result of indigenous peoples’ struggles and social movements, beginning with Chico Mendes’ fight for rubber tappers.

 

In the last decade the struggle has arrived to economic questions. The economic model based on non-timber forest products - such as brazil nuts, babassu fruits, natural rubber - has the potential to be an economic alternative for the region - a new economy  that would support both standing forest and community strength. During  the  Workers ’  Party rule period the  Brazilian Government began to support forest people. As an environmental policy the Government  did not only fight deforestation using methods of command and control but established  protected areas for forest peoples and created supporting policies to make the products of the forest  economically viable. The objective of this paper is to present the economies of Amazonian non-timber forest gatherers as a good strategy to improve the life of forest peoples conserving the environment. We start discussing the history of the amazon rainforest deforestation and the strategies the Brazilian government used to fight it, highlighting the role of development of the non-timber forest products economy into the environmental policy. Then we showcase the brazil nut tree and production chain as an example of activity that generate income for the forest people maintaining the forest stand.Finally we discuss how social and environmental features are related to economic practices and should be considered in policies. The Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) has been supporting indigenous and other traditional communities in their fight for rights since the NGO’s creation in the year of 1994.The perspective of this discussion comes as agents for ISA in the Xingu River Basin, working directly with indigenous people supporting sustainable income generation and mediating their access to the government production support policies.

 

Key words:

Amazon rainforest, Brazil Nut fruit, Forest People, Forest Conservation, Deforestation.

 

 

 

Introduction:

Among the ecosystems that have not suffered substantial degradation and fragmentation of their original vegetation cover, the Amazon stands out for the extraordinary continuity of its forests, the length of its hydrographic network, the subtle variations of its ecosystems and its immeasurable biodiversity (Absaber et al, 1994). Presently, both scientists and global public opinion are aware of how important this great forest is for the equilibrium of several planetary biogeochemical cycles.Although the Amazon Rainforest is still mostly preserved, when its degradation history is taken into account, there rises a great cause for concern. Until 1960, the rainforest was practically intact. But, from then on, as the Brazilian government implemented colonization projects, 10 to 12% of its original vegetation cover was abruptly eliminated in less than 20 years. Deforestation rates were substantially reduced during the first decade of the 2000s due to the Brazilian government’s massive investment of resources in inspection and control actions on illegal activities with great destructive potential. However, deforestation went on, reaching almost 20% of the original forest (around 800.000 km²). This happens due to the fact that although the majority of the Brazilian society are in favor of preserving nature, the Brazilian statesmen until now still never could combine their socioeconomic development model with nature conservation (Absaber et al., 1989; Carneiro et al., 2011; Becker,1988).

 

In Brazil, although the conservation or preservation of natural ecosystems is provided for in the Constitution, great part of State actions are underpinned by the expansionist agenda inherited from the military rule period, that seeks to implement territorial development through large projects, such as the Grande Carajas, an iron mining project in the past, and the current construction of Belo Monte’s hydroelectric plant. This strategy acts in favor of political and economic interests to the detriment of strong environmental impact and quite often generates results disconnected from social development notions (Goncalves, 2001). This loss of forest caused by this model is not only an environmental disaster, but a great social tragedy. Losing the basis for their traditional ways of life, forest communities are being ejected from their territories to urban peripheries where they become underemployed, thus nurturing a haphazard migration process that negatively affects localities around conservation units and promotes population swelling in major cities (Barreto et al., 2001).

 

On the other hand, until the 1990s even the environmental policy, based on the creation of large strict natural reserve areas, worked towards the ejection of traditional people from their places. This was based on the assumption that any human inside the area should be ejected in order to preserve the pristine character of the ecosystem. The ecological reason behind this paradigm is based on a wrong assumption, as it does not take into consideration that the Amazon’s vigorous natural landscape is not as untouched as one thinks but a result of the interaction between indigenous people and the forest for the last 10.000 years (Miller et al., 2006). Researches are also showing that some ecologically important species abundant in the forest nowadays have spread around the whole territory supported by human population for centuries. Among these species are some that are considered symbol of the forest as the brasil nut tree (Balee, 2013; Levis et al., 2017). From the 1980s onwards, indigenous people and social movements, beginning with Chico Mendes’ fight for rubber gatherers, have intensified their struggle for territorial rights, having achieved the creation of a great number of protected areas for exclusive use of forest peoples (da Cunha et al., 2000). In the last decade the struggle has arrived to economic questions. The economic model based on non-timber forest products, such as Brazil nuts, babassu fruits and natural rubber, has shown great potential to be an alternative economic option for the region, one that would support both standing forest and community strength. During the first two presidential terms of the Workers’ Party (2002-2010), its closeness to social movements

was a determining factor for the creation of policies that could fill the gaps in the forest’s productive chain.

 

Materials and Methods:

The aim of this article is to showcase forest gathering activities within the context of environmental policy. We present and discuss the Brazilian Government policies created to support the non-timber forest production chains. To illustrate the case, the production chain of the Brazil nut will be used as an example. The first part of the paper introduces the Brazilian environmental policy for the Amazon formalized by the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm). It demonstrates the limited extent such policy can reach in a context in which there is an unfavorable national policy for territorial development. To illustrate the case, we present data from Terra Class analysis, by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), on the causes for deforestation in the Amazon, and also data on rural financing programs for small and medium farmers in the mid-western region of Para State from 2014 to 2017. The role of strengthening production activities related to the standing forest maintenance in environmental policy wraps the debate up.

 

In the second part of the paper, we present the Brazil nut traditional gathering system and debated it as the largest production chain of a non-timber forest product and a key in the search for economic sustainability in Indigenous Lands and Sustainable Use Conservation Units. The challenges faced in strengthening the base of the system and the policies that could make it feasible are also brought into discussion.The basis for the discussion is the supporting work for gatherers and Indigenous associations from Terra do Meio, in the Para State in Brazil, realized by the Instituto Socioambiental from 2013 to 2019.

 

In the third and last part of the paper, we overview the policies inherent problems. We then establish a link to the stance taken by the Brazilian government structure on the issue. We end highlighting the need to introduce producers into policy creation and management boards to reach better results.

 

Results and Discussion:

(a) The promotion of sustainable production practices in tackling deforestation:

After the Brazilian Constitution was enacted in 1988, the great leap in the country’s environmental policy took place in 2004 in response to alarming peak deforestation rates in the Amazon Rainforest. From then on, the Brazilian government implemented more effective policies in tackling deforestation, as formalized in PPCDAm (PPCDAm, 2004).Command and control measures were adopted from 2004 onwards and successfully reduced the high deforestation rates from around 30.000 km² per year to less than 5.000 km² per year in 2012. However, in the following years the rates increased again, reaching almost in 2017 (INPE/PRODES,2018).

 

This escalation on deforestation rates was not caused solely by the decrease in investments in the environment during the first rule period of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014). The main limiting factor to the effectiveness of the government’s protection policies in lies in Brazilian policies’ inherent contradictions. On the one hand, the Brazilian State invests in monitoring deforestation rates and punishes some specific activities, such as illegal timber exploitation or wild animal trafficking. But, on the other hand, it widely encourages territorial development through activities which are incompatible with forest maintenance, such as soybean plantation and cattle ranching (De Mello et al, 2017). Therefore, the government have been being undoubtedly the main driver of deforestation in the Amazon.

 

Public policy and deforestation: the Para State example:

Governmental promotion of cattle ranching in the Amazon region is a good example of the situation as pointed out above. Having used satellite images of the Legal Amazon region to monitor vegetation cover since 2004, INPE’s Terra Class analysis shows that forest conversion to cattle pasture is the main cause of deforestation in the Amazon, representing more than 60 percent of deforested land (INPE/TERRACLASS,2017). The government’s Supply’s Agriculture and Livestock Plan seeks to provide large investments for cattle ranching in the country’s Northern region annually.The data on rural finance from the Pará State Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Company’s office in Altamira shows the situation locally. In Pará’s mid-western region from January 2014 to January 2017 out of R$6.440.035,04 (USD 1.582.318,19) provided by Banco da Amazônia (Bank of Amazon) via PRONAF and PRONAMP (rural credit lines for small and medium farmers), R$ 5.926.040,60 (USD 1.456.029,63) were actually addressed to cattle ranching. This represents more than 92 percent of the resources. It should be highlighted that the survey does not take into account data on large agribusiness farmers, who get far more subsided financing for their businesses.

 

 

Graph1. History of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon according to PRODES and projection of reaching the goal of the Brazilian Nacional Policy on Climate Change (DPCD/MMA, 2017)

 

 

Sustainable production practices and their role in tackling deforestation:

The Brazilian government, in PPCDAm’s 3^rd phase (2012-2015), has acknowledged that a definitive reduction in deforestation rates cannot be solved through the implementation of environmental monitoring practices only. Based on that, PPCDAm focused on 3 thematic axes in order to meet the National Policy on Climate Change target for 2020. They are: Environmental Monitoring and Control; Land Tenure and Territorial Planning and Sustainable Production Fostering (PPCDAm, 2012). The discussion on this paper focus on the last one.

 

(b) The production chain example

The iconic tree (Bertholletia excelsa) is a large upper-canopy tree species, usually centenary with 30 to 50 m tall and with a trunk with 1 to 2 m in diameter (Lorenzi, 2002). The Brazil Nut fruit is a hard round woody ball with diameter around 10 cm -almost the size of a coconut. It takes 13 months on the canopy to mature. Inside the fruit the seeds lay loose ( 20 per fruit on average). The seeds are consumed raw or used to oil extraction and are rich in protein, lipids and vitamins. Once a year during a short period of few months the fruits fall from the trees. As the canopies are very high, it is virtually impossible to crop them and it is also dangerous to be under a tree during the fruit falling season. The tree productivity varies from year to year depending on uncontrollable natural factors such as the annual rain amount, the rainy season start time, or occurrence of insects attack. As there is a lack of scientific knowledge about the species (Shanley et al, 2016), it is still not possible to foresee the tree behavior under the natural variables.

Fig1:Two gatherers in front a centenary Brazil nut tree.RESEX Lago do Cunia (RO)

Fig 2: Xipaya women collecting Brasil Nut fruits -  Xipaya Indigenous Land (PA)

 

The Brazil Nut tree is a gregorial species that occurs in densities between 1.3 to 12 adult individuals per hectare (Peres et al.,1997; Scoles et al., 2011). It is spread all around the rainforest area (map 1). The longevity of the species is of more than 500 years (Scoles et al, 2011). As the dispersal strategy of the species is very inefficient (the only mammal besides the human that can open the shell is the agouti, Dasyprocta leporine) and the genetic variability of the species is very low, some researches indicate that the dispersion pattern has anthropogenic origins (Shepard et al., 2011; Gribel et al., 2007). Today the Brazil Nut tree is not being planted but the Brazil Nut groves are still being managed by the indigenous and traditional people.

 

Their fruits were first commercially harvested during and, mainly, after the decline of the first rubber boom (1879 to 1912), and the nuts are now consumed worldwide (2005). The Brazil nut is seen as key to Indigenous Lands’ and Sustainable Use Conservation Units’ search for economic sustainability due to its natural availability through almost all of the Amazonian territory, its connection to the standing forest maintenance, and its large growing market (Pereira, 2000).

 

Figure 3: Distribution of the Brazil nut (Bertholletia excelsa). (Shephard et al, 2011).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Work:

Figure 3: Arara man breaking Brazil nut shells with machete - Cachoeira Seca Indigenous land (PA).

Figure 4: Young men carrying Brazil nuts From  the  forest to the village –  Xipaya Indigenous land.

 

The gatherers collect the fruits from the ground and then break them up with machetes to extract the seeds. They carry the seeds on their back in handmade baskets that might weight more than 50 kg through forest trails that might have up to 5 km.

 

 

The people of an extended family usually work together. As the Brazil Nut groves oftenly are not near by the family dwellings, the gatherers usually make camp expeditions to the isolated areas and stay up to one month working. During a year of high harvest is common a family collect more than 2 tons of raw nut. Brazil Nut is taken as the foremost non timber product from the forest because added to the wide dispersion, it is already a well known product with growing international demand.Although in the last years the nut market is continuously improving, this doesn’t reflect to the production chain base. The income it generates depends on the market price that is fluctuating, as food commodities: it is high when there is not much produce available and low when there is a big national harvest. In the last years in the Médio Xingu region, Pará State, the raw Brazil Nut price stick around R$2,50 to R$7,00/kg (USD 0,61 to USD 1,72/kg) As most part of gatherers’ communities are in inaccessible, isolated areas, they have to resort to just the few traditional river traders middlemen as their only link to the market. Under those conditions, these are the agents who define the local prices of the products, usually paying a small part of the price from consuming markets (Guariguata et al, 2017). To illustrate, Table 1 shows prices of the Brazil nut in different stages of the production chain in the Pará state in 2016.

 

Table1. Pricing of Brazil nut in kilograms in different markets in 2016. (Source: author’s research data)

 

Stage in Production Chain	Price (R$/Kg)
Fresh nut for middlemen (harvest period) (Iriri River- Altamira’s Rural Area - PA)	1.50
Fresh nut in Belém (harvest period) (industry wholesale price)	5.00
Fresh nut in Belém (interharvest period) (industry wholesale price)	7.00
Fresh Nut in São Paulo (retail price)	13.00

 

Data in the chart above show that the pricing of the nut varies sensitively not only locally, but seasonally. And for the last years, peaking price in interharvest periods is 3 times higher than lower price during harvest periods. Gatherers usually do not take advantage of higher prices as they do not have resources to bring their produce to the cities and being very poor with no savings, they rely on the produce being paid in cash during harvest period. In addition, when middlemen are the only commercial option for local communities, besides paying low prices for the produce, they usually pay for the produce with overpriced merchandise. Table 2 below demonstrates compared price variation between Interunion Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE), Altamira's local market and Iriri River's dealers in 2015:

 

  Table 2 - Price comparison chart made by the author (1 real=0,25 US dollar)

 

Product	Price   range (Reals)
	DIEESE	Altamira's market	Dealer
Pack of Rice (5kg)	10,90	11,90	30,00
Bag of Bean[s] (1kg)	5,22	4,50	12,00
Can of Oil (1L)	3,24	2,26	7,00
Margarine (500g)	-	3,50	15,00
Coffee (250g)	4,00	3,50	7,00
Pack of sugar (2kg)	5,10	3,58	8,00
Can of powdered milk	-	8,95	20,00

 

For that reason, in many regions the nut gathering activity has been gradually abandoned and replaced by more modern, lighter and/or better-paid occupations. When nut collection areas were finally reached by developmental policies, conversion of forest into pasture or monocultures was  quite frequent, leading to large rural exodus (Homma, 2001).Currently, there are three Brazilian policies that could positively act on Brazil nut production chain and ensure fair pay for indigenous and traditional peoples communities, following positive market trends. These are: guarantee of minimum price for sociobiodiversity products policy (PGPMBio), institutional markets and stock building program. Each of these polices will be analyzed in the chapters that follow.

 

PGPMBio:

PGPMBio was created by the Brazilian government in 2009. It is a subsidy policy aimed specifically at traditional peoples produce. Through production cost estimates, the government establishes a minimum price for a range of products and makes up the difference between retail price and the minimum established price for gatherers. So that the received price can be proved, gatherers must present a commercial invoice.This policy is mostly applied to production chains in which there are alternative commercial options resulting from monoculture systems. This kind of produce present a much lower production cost than those resulting from forest-preserving extensive systems. For example, forest rubber is few times more expensive than plantation rubber; and babassu oil is few times more expensive than soybean oil, or any other cooking oil. This policy could assure that the gatherer would get a fair price in harvest season peak when prices are at their minimum. However, this policy has never been accessible for this product in the Para State.The first reason is that the nut is usually sold for grey-market middlemen. As far as the policy is concerned, if there are no invoices, it is not possible to access to any subsidy. Moreover, even if there was an invoice, current government-set minimum price (around R$1.00 per kg, [US$0.25]) is too low. For gatherers who are able to legally market the average price has not gotten any close to government-set minimum price in a long time. In Terra do Meio region the Brazil nut price has varied between R$2.00 (US$0.50) and R$7.00 (US$1.75) per kg in the last 5 years, since a network of gatherers was established. Even if the government price could be eventually reached in a really bad year in a very remote place it would not be an advantage for nut gatherers to go from the middle of the forest to the city just to receive such insignificant compensation.So that they could be adequate, production costs and minimum prices should be projected locally  through a collaborative network between technicians and producers. The National Company of Supplying (CONAB) is already promoting actions of this kind in other production chains, e.g., rubber's. However, these studies have not been put into practice yet.

 

Having followed closely CONAB’s establishment of a produce's minimum price, it has been noted that there is very little strategic alignment of the programs among government departments. According to CONAB's technicians; the Ministries of Planning is the organ that vetoes the implementation of higher minimum prices. The bureaucrats, who are not close to the environmental area, tend to want to save in costs when it comes to social policies, not being aware that investing in the forest productive chains means saving money that would be spent in the prevention of deforestation. Actually, the solution would be better planning and interministerial cooperation.

 

Institutional Markets:

Brazilian public institutions such as schools, army units and prisons are legally obliged to buy an established amount of their food requirement from family farming. Indigenous peoples and traditional communities formally belong to this category. The price paid for the produce are most often taken in street markets, making such prices very interesting for the producers. The nut retail price is equivalent to prices during interharvest period (R$5.00 [US$1.25] to R$10.00 [US$2.50] per kg). Selling the produce in those markets could be a solution. However, they are rarely accessible for nut gatherers, for a number of reasons. The majority of public institutions are not able to make this kind of purchase as they are not any close to rural producers. When there is an approximation between both parts, imposed sanitary/ bureaucratic requirements stops the gatherers from marketing their produce in the institutional market.Just as an example of how complicated the scenario is, most rural families in Brazil are not even able to claim the document that proves that they are small farmers (the so called DAP), which would allow them to have access to the policies. For those who have access to the policies, a major problem is how long it takes for the deliveries to be paid. The government does not pay the purchases as fast as they should and this could take a very long time.

 

This makes the commercial relationship completely infeasible for the gatherers.In order to meet the targets established by law, the institutions that are legally obliged to buy from family farming should have an expert who could coordinate the policies with local producers’ organizations.The issuing of DAP for small farmers' families should be compulsory for the government in the same way issuing an ID is. As a result, small farmers would not be hindered from gaining access to policies that are for their benefit just because they lack a document.Payment terms for small farmers should be shorter. An alternative solution for this issue comes from grassroots organizations. If they are capitalized, the organizations can fully or partially pay the farmers in advance while the government transaction is concluded. The policy presented next may work synergistically with the payment term issue.

 

Stock creation program:

Stock building is nowadays the main strategy used by grassroots organizations to strength the Brazil nut value chain. The community production organized into a stock is used not only to push middlemen into paying better prices for the product but also to enable the produce sales for favorable prices in distant markets or  during the interharvest period. The main condition for the creation of a community stock is the existence of working capital to pay producers at the same time they give their produce to the stock.

 

Since 2006, there has been in Brazil a policy acting on this issue: the federal policy for stock creation in CONAB's Food Acquisition Program (PAA Estoque).The PAA Estoque policy aims at making to small farmer’s organization subsidized loans  (at 6% per year interest rate) to finance stock creation of specific products. Instead of conventional loan guarantee requirements, unsuitable to the small farmers, this policy considers the stock itself as a guarantee for the loan. The main obstacle to access this policy is how  long  it  takes  for   government  agencies  to process requests,  which affects the policy's efficiency. If  the  funds  get to the  producer after  the  harvest period, it  is  not possible to make stock then. Therefore, an essential adjustment in the policy is to follow a strict fund release schedule, in the same way it is done for agribusiness, that never misses the harvest because of a delay in the release of funds.The appropriateness of the price as established in PGPMBio is a concern in this policy.  CONAB's strategy is to ensure the lowest viable price for the product in order to enable producers to wait for the next interharvest season. The disadvantage here is that a low-priced stock does not push prices established by middlemen up. On the contrary. If the prices established by middlemen are higher, there will be a great amount of nuts that would go into community stock, being diverted to middlemen.

 

 

 Conclusion:

Data in the first part of the paper show that, despite having a deforestation policy, it is the Brazilian State that encourages the destruction of the forest through its policies. In order to address this problem, it is fundamental to implement complementary policies aiming at issues other than just command and control measures. Considering this scenario, measures aiming at strengthening sustainable production practices have a fundamental role, combining forest maintenance and socioeconomic development of territories.There has been many government programs created in the last few years, such as the National Plan for the Promotion of Sociobiodiversity Products (PNPSB), National Policy for Sustainable Development of Traditional Peoples and Communities (PNPCT), National Policy for Territorial and Environmental Management of Indigenous Lands (PNGATI), and the recent National Plan for the Strengthening of Extractive and Riverside Communities (PLANAFE). They show that the federal government's administrative structure is qualified and sensitive to environmental issues. However, the advances and efforts of those agents in creating and implementing policies are wasted in the machinery of the government, which is inherently unfavorable to them.The solution then is to establish direct and permanent dialogue between producers and legislators, as well as with other institutions directly or indirectly connected to the implementation of policies.Having members of public institutions that are directly or indirectly involved in policy implementation as part of this council would smoothen conflicts to a great extent. This would make policy implementation easier and would promote a faster access to all of these policies by indigenous peoples and traditional communities.

 

Sadly, all this progress in the environmental policies in Brazil that happened from 2004 onwards presented in this paper is under heavy threat now by the election of a new conservative president in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro. His government is aligned to the most destructive face of development, that one unconcerned  with the sustainable use of the natural resources. During his first months in power he tried to extinguished the Ministry of Environment. Not managing that, he designated as minister a person who is actually against environmental protection, aiming at undermining all the existing policies, from command and control to sustainable production supporting, in favor of resources exploration without rules. Environmental institutions are being weakened, budgets are being cut and professionals are being persecuted.

 

This disassemble of the environmental policies and institutions is leading to a rise on deforestation rates, wild fires, irregular mining and timber exploration. The incommensurable damage will leave a scar at the forest and will deepen the human tragedy in the region.

 

Acknowledgements:

I wish to express my deep gratitude for all the people from ISA, especially those from the Xingu Program from Altamira and Brasilia offices: you not only make possible this revolution that is going on here, but are incredible friends that make very pleasurable my live in Amazonia.I would like also to thanks Simone de Jesus Barros da Silva from the EMATER-PA’s regional office in Altamira for always sharing with me the information I need to analyze the Brazilian rural policies in our region every year. 

                                                               

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 Cited as:

Leonardo H.L. de Moura (2020) Brazil Nuts and Human: mazes to the Amazon Forest conservation. Sarkar A.K. (ED) Organisms and Environment, Educreation Publishing, New Delhi, 79-90.